Description: DESCRIPTION : Up for auction is the ULTRA RARE Hebrew BOOK - BOOKLET , Being the OFFICIAL REPORT ( With the ORIGINAL PARTITION MAP and JERUSALEM MAP ) of the UN RESOLUTION from NOVEMBER 29th - 30th 1947 which was published in 1947 by the Hebrew daily newspaper HA'ARETZ ( "הארץ" ) . The UN RESOLUTION which decided and announced the end of the British Mandate and creation of the INDEPENDENT STATE OF ISRAEL has innitiated a PARTITION PLAN , Whose MAP is included in the REPORT and as such included in this sale. Original SC. 32 pp. 5 x 6.5" . THREE printed MAPS . Very good condition. Tightly bound. Clean. ( Please look at scan for accurate AS IS images ) Will be sent in a special protective rigid sealed packaging. PAYMENTS : Payment method accepted : Paypal & All credit cards.SHIPPMENT : Shipp worldwide via registered airmail is $ 29. Will be sent in a special protective rigid sealed packaging. Will be sent around 5-10 days after payment . The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was a proposal by the United Nations, which recommended a partition of Mandatory Palestine at the end of the British Mandate. On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted the Plan as Resolution 181(II).[2] The resolution recommended the creation of independent Arab and Jewish States and a Special International Regime for the city of Jerusalem. The Partition Plan, a four-part document attached to the resolution, provided for the termination of the Mandate, the progressive withdrawal of British armed forces and the delineation of boundaries between the two States and Jerusalem. Part I of the Plan stipulated that the Mandate would be terminated as soon as possible and the United Kingdom would withdraw no later than 1 August 1948. The new states would come into existence two months after the withdrawal, but no later than 1 October 1948. The Plan sought to address the conflicting objectives and claims of two competing movements, Palestinian nationalism and Jewish nationalism, or Zionism.[3][4] The Plan also called for Economic Union between the proposed states, and for the protection of religious and minority rights. The Plan was accepted by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, despite its perceived limitations.[5][6] Arab leaders and governments rejected it[7] and indicated an unwillingness to accept any form of territorial division,[8] arguing that it violated the principles of national self-determination in the UN Charter which granted people the right to decide their own destiny.[6][9] Immediately after adoption of the Resolution by the General Assembly, a civil war broke out[10] and the plan was not implemented.[11] Contents [hide] 1Background 2United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) 2.1UNSCOP report 2.2Proposed Partition 3Ad hoc Committee 3.1Sub-Committee 2 3.2Boundary changes 4The vote 4.1Reports of pressure for and against the Plan 4.1.1Reports of pressure for the Plan 4.1.2Reports of pressure against the Plan 4.2Final vote 4.2.1In favour, (33 countries, 72% of voting) 4.2.2Against, (13 countries, 28% of voting) 4.2.3Abstentions, (10 countries) 4.2.4Absent, (1 country) 4.3Votes by modern region 5Reactions 5.1Jews 5.2Arabs 5.2.1Arab States 5.2.2Arabs in Palestine 5.3British government 5.4United States government 6Subsequent events 7Resolution 181 as a legal basis for Palestinian statehood 8Retrospect 9See also 10Footnotes 11References 12Bibliography 13External links Background[edit] The British administration was formalized by the League of Nations under the Palestine Mandate in 1923, as part of the Partitioning of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. The Mandate reaffirmed the 1917 British commitment to the Balfour Declaration, for the establishment in Palestine of a "National Home" for the Jewish people, with the prerogative to carry it out.[12][13] A British census of 1918 estimated 700,000 Arabs and 56,000 Jews.[12] In 1937, following a six-month-long Arab General Strike and armed insurrection which aimed to pursue national independence and secure the country from foreign control, the British established the Peel Commission.[14] The Commission concluded that the Mandate had become unworkable, and recommended Partition into an Arab state linked to Transjordan; a small Jewish state; and a mandatory zone. To address problems arising from the presence of national minorities in each area, it suggested a land and population transfer[15] involving the transfer of some 225,000 Arabs living in the envisaged Jewish state and 1,250 Jews living in a future Arab state, a measure deemed compulsory "in the last resort".[15][16][17] To address any economic problems, the Plan proposed avoiding interfering with Jewish immigration, since any interference would be liable to produce an "economic crisis", most of Palestine's wealth coming from the Jewish community. To solve the predicted annual budget deficit of the Arab State and reduction in public services due to loss of tax from the Jewish state, it was proposed that the Jewish state pay an annual subsidy to the Arab state and take on half of the latter's deficit.[15][16][18] The Palestinian Arab leadership rejected partition as unacceptable, given the inequality in the proposed population exchange and the transfer of one-third of Palestine, including most of its best agricultural land, to recent immigrants.[17] The Jewish leaders, Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, persuaded the Zionist Congress to lend provisional approval to the Peel recommendations as a basis for further negotiations.[19][20][21][22] In a letter to his son in October 1937, Ben-Gurion explained that partition would be a first step to "possession of the land as a whole".[23][24][25]The same sentiment, that acceptance of partition was a temporary measure beyond which the Palestine would be "redeemed . . in its entirety,"[26] was recorded by Ben-Gurion on other occasions, such as at a meeting of the Jewish Agency executive in June 1938,[27] as well as by Chaim Weizmann.[25][28] The British Woodhead Commission was set up to examine the practicality of partition. The Peel plan was rejected and two possible alternatives were considered. In 1938 the British government issued a policy statement declaring that "the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable". Representatives of Arabs and Jews were invited to London for the St. James Conference, which proved unsuccessful.[29] With World War II looming, British policies were influenced by a desire to win Arab world support and could ill afford to engage with another Arab uprising.[30] The MacDonald White Paper of May 1939 declared that it was "not part of [the British government's] policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State", sought to limit Jewish immigration to Palestine and restricted Arab land sales to Jews. However, the League of Nations commission held that the White Paper was in conflict with the terms of the Mandate as put forth in the past. The outbreak of the Second World War suspended any further deliberations.[31][32] The Jewish Agency hoped to persuade the British to restore Jewish immigration rights, and cooperated with the British in the war against Fascism. Aliyah Bet was organized to spirit Jews out of Nazi controlled Europe, despite the British prohibitions. The White Paper also led to the formation of Lehi, a small Jewish organization which opposed the British. After World War II, in August 1945 President Truman asked for the admission of 100,000 Holocaust survivors into Palestine[33] but the British maintained limits on Jewish immigration in line with the 1939 White Paper. The Jewish community rejected the restriction on immigration and organized an armed resistance. These actions and United States pressure to end the anti-immigration policy led to the establishment of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. In April 1946, the Committee reached a unanimous decision for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees from Europe into Palestine, rescission of the white paper restrictions of land sale to Jews, that the country be neither Arab nor Jewish, and the extension of U.N. Trusteeship. U.S. endorsed the Commission findings concerning Jewish immigration and land purchase restrictions,[34] while U.K. conditioned their implementation on U.S. assistance in case of another Arab revolt.[34] In effect the British continued to carry out its White Paper policy.[35] The recommendations triggered violent demonstrations in the Arab states, and calls for a Jihad and an annihilation of all European Jews in Palestine.[36] United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)[edit] Further information: UNSCOP Map showing Jewish-owned land as of 31 December 1944, including land owned in full, shared in undivided land and State Lands under concession. This constituted 6% of the total land area or 20% of cultivative land,[37] of which more than half was held by the JNF and PICA[38] League of Nations A-class mandatory territories were to revert to sovereign states on their termination, and after WW2, this is what occurred with the exception of Palestine.[39][40] In February 1947, Britain announced its intent to terminate the Mandate for Palestine, referring the matter of the future of Palestine to the United Nations.[41] The hope was that a binational state would ensue, which meant an unpartitioned Palestine. Ernest Bevin's policy was premised on the idea that an Arab majority would carry the day, which met difficulties with Harry Truman who, sensitive to Zionist electoral pressures in the United States, pressed for a British-Zionist compromise.[42] In May, the UN formed a Special Committee (UNSCOP) to prepare a report on recommendations for Palestine. The Jewish Agency pressed for Jewish representation and the exclusion of both Britain and Arab countries on the Committee, sought visits to camps where Holocaust survivors were interned in Europe as part of UNSCOP's brief, and in May won representation on the Political Committee.[43] The Arab states, convinced statehood had been subverted, and that the transition of authority from the League of Nations to the UN was questionable in law, wished the issues to be brought before an International Court, and refused to collaborate with UNSCOP, which had extended an invitation for liaison also to the Arab Higher Committee.[40][44] In August, after three months of conducting hearings and a general survey of the situation in Palestine, a majority report of the committee recommended that the region be partitioned into an Arab and a Jewish state, which should retain an economic union. An international regime was envisioned for Jerusalem. The Arab delegations at the UN had sought to keep separate the issue of Palestine from the issue of Jewish refugees in Europe. During their visit, UNSCOP members were shocked by the extent of Lehi and Irgun violence, then at its apogee, and by the elaborate military presence attested by endemic barb-wire, searchlights, and armoured-car patrols. Committee members also witnessed the SS Exodus affair in Haifa and could hardly have remained unaffected by it. On concluding their mission, they dispatched a subcommittee to investigate Jewish refugee camps in Europe.[45][46] The incident is mentioned in the report in relation to Jewish distrust and resentment concerning the British enforcement of the White Paper 1939.[47] UNSCOP report[edit] On 3 September 1947, the Committee reported to the General Assembly.CHAPTER V: PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS (I), Section A of the Report contained eleven proposed recommendations (I - XI) approved unanimously. Section B contained one proposed recommendation approved by a substantial majority dealing with the Jewish problem in general (XI). CHAPTER VI: PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS (II) contained a Plan of Partition with Economic Union to which seven members of the Committee (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay), expressed themselves in favour. CHAPTER VII RECOMMENDATIONS (III)' contained a comprehensive proposal that was voted upon and supported by three members (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia) for a Federal State of Palestine. Australia abstained. In CHAPTER VIII a number of members of the Committee expressed certain reservations and observations.[48] Proposed Partition[edit] See also: Land ownership of the British Mandate of Palestine Land ownership Population distribution Two maps reviewed by UN Subcommittee 2 in considering partition The report of the majority of the Committee (CHAPTER VI) envisaged the division of Palestine into three parts: an Arab State, a Jewish State and the City of Jerusalem, linked by extraterritorial crossroads. The proposed Arab State would include the central and part of western Galilee, with the town of Acre, the hill country of Samaria and Judea, an enclave at Jaffa, and the southern coast stretching from north of Isdud (now Ashdod) and encompassing what is now the Gaza Strip, with a section of desert along the Egyptian border. The proposed Jewish State would include the fertile Eastern Galilee, the Coastal Plain, stretching from Haifa to Rehovot and most of the Negev desert,[49] including the southern outpost of Umm Rashrash (now Eilat). The Jerusalem Corpus Separatum included Bethlehem and the surrounding areas. The primary objectives of the majority of the Committee were political division and economic unity between the two groups.[50] The Plan tried its best to accommodate as many Jews as possible into the Jewish State. In many specific cases,[citation needed] this meant including areas of Arab majority (but with a significant Jewish minority) in the Jewish state. Thus the Jewish State would have an overall large Arab minority. Areas that were sparsely populated (like the Negev desert), were also included in the Jewish state to create room for immigration. According to the plan, Jews and Arabs living in the Jewish state would become citizens of the Jewish state and Jews and Arabs living in the Arab state would become citizens of the Arab state. By virtue of Chapter 3, Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, resided in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem would, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they were resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. The Plan would have had the following demographics (data based on 1945). TerritoryArab and other population % Arab and otherJewish population % JewishTotal population Arab State725,00099%10,0001%735,000 Jewish State407,00045%498,00055%905,000 International105,00051%100,00049%205,000 Total1,237,00067%608,00033%1,845,000 Data from the Report of UNSCOP: 3 September 1947: CHAPTER 4: A COMMENTARY ON PARTITION The land allocated to the Arab State in the final plan included about 43% of Mandatory Palestine[51][unreliable source?] and consisted of all of the highlands, except for Jerusalem, plus one-third of the coastline. The highlands contain the major aquifers of Palestine, which supplied water to the coastal cities of central Palestine, including Tel Aviv.[52][unreliable source?] The Jewish State was to receive 56% of Mandatory Palestine, a slightly larger area to accommodate the increasing numbers of Jews who would immigrate there.[51][unreliable source?][53] The Jewish State included three fertile lowland plains – the Sharon on the coast, the Jezreel Valley and the upper Jordan Valley. The bulk of the proposed Jewish State's territory, however, consisted of the Negev Desert.[49] The desert was not suitable for agriculture, nor for urban development at that time. The Jewish State would also be given sole access to the Red Sea. The committee voted for the plan, 25 to 13 (with 17 abstentions) on 25 November 1947 and the General Assembly was called back into a special session to vote on the proposal. Various sources noted that this was one vote short of the two-thirds majority required in the General Assembly.[53] Ad hoc Committee[edit] Boundaries defined in the 1947 UN Partition Plan for Palestine: Area assigned for a Jewish state; Area assigned for an Arab state; Planned Corpus separatum with the intention that Jerusalem would be neither Jewish nor Arab Armistice Demarcation Lines of 1949: Israeli controlled territory from 1949; Arab controlled territory until 1967 On 23 September 1947 the General Assembly established an ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question to consider the UNSCOP report. Representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and Jewish Agency were invited and attended.[54] During the committee's deliberations, the British government endorsed the report's recommendations concerning the end of the mandate, independence, and Jewish immigration.[citation needed] However, the British did "not feel able to implement" any agreement unless it was acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, and asked that the General Assembly provide an alternative implementing authority if that proved to be the case. The Arab Higher Committee rejected both the majority and minority recommendations within the UNSCOP report. They "concluded from a survey of Palestine history that Zionist claims to that country had no legal or moral basis". The Arab Higher Committee argued that only an Arab State in the whole of Palestine would be consistent with the UN Charter. The Jewish Agency expressed support for most of the UNSCOP recommendations, but emphasized the "intense urge" of the overwhelming majority of Jewish displaced persons to proceed to Palestine. The Jewish Agency criticized the proposed boundaries, especially in the Western Galilee and Western Jerusalem (outside of the old city), arguing that these should be included in the Jewish state. However, they agreed to accept the plan if "it would make possible the immediate re-establishment of the Jewish State with sovereign control of its own immigration." Arab states requested representation on the UN ad hoc subcommittees of October 1947, but were excluded from Subcommittee One, which had been delegated the specific task of studying and, if thought necessary, modifying the boundaries of the proposed Partition.[55] Sub-Committee 2[edit] The Sub-Committee 2, set up on 23 October 1947 to draw up a detailed plan based on proposals of Arab states presented its report within a few weeks.[56] Based on a reproduced British report, the Sub-Committee 2 criticised the UNSCOP report for using inaccurate population figures, especially concerning the Bedouin population. The British report, dated 1 November 1947, used the results of a new census in Beersheba in 1946 with additional use of aerial photographs, and an estimate of the population in other districts. It found that the size of the Bedouin population was greatly understated in former enumerations. In Beersheba, 3,389 Bedouin houses and 8,722 tents were counted. The total Bedouin population was estimated at approximately 127,000; only 22,000 of them normally resident in the Arab state under the UNSCOP majority plan. The British report stated: "It should be noted that the term Beersheba Bedouin has a meaning more definite than one would expect in the case of a nomad population. These tribes, wherever they are found in Palestine, will always describe themselves as Beersheba tribes. Their attachment to the area arises from their land rights there and their historic association with it."[57] In respect of the UNSCOP report, the Sub-Committee concluded that the earlier population ″estimates must, however, be corrected in the light of the information furnished to the Sub-Committee by the representative of the United Kingdom regarding the Bedouin population. According to the statement, 22,000 Bedouins may be taken as normally residing in the areas allocated to the Arab State under the UNSCOP's majority plan, and the balance of 105,000 as resident in the proposed Jewish State. It will thus be seen that the proposed Jewish State will contain a total population of 1,008,800, consisting of 509,780 Arabs and 499,020 Jews. In other words, at the outset, the Arabs will have a majority in the proposed Jewish State.″[58] The Sub-Committee 2 recommended to put the question of the Partition Plan before the International Court of Justice (Resolution No. I [59]). In respect of the Jewish refugees due to World War II, the Sub-Committee recommended to request the countries of which the refugees belonged to take them back as much as possible (Resolution No. II[60]). The Sub-Committee proposed to establish a unitary state (Resolution No. III[61]). Boundary changes[edit] The ad hoc committee made a number of boundary changes to the UNSCOP recommendations before they were voted on by the General Assembly. The predominantly Arab city of Jaffa, previously located within the Jewish state, was constituted as an enclave of the Arab State. The boundary of the Arab state was modified to include Beersheba and a strip of the Negev desert along the Egyptian border,[49] while a section of the Dead Sea shore and other additions were made to the Jewish State. This move increased the Jewish percentage in the Jewish state from 55% to 61%.[citation needed] The proposed boundaries would also have placed 54 Arab villages on the opposite side of the border from their farm land.[citation needed] In response, the United Nations Palestine Commission was empowered to modify the boundaries "in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary". These modifications never occurred. The vote[edit] Passage of the resolution required a two-thirds majority of the valid votes, not counting abstaining and absent members, of the UN's then 56 member states. On 26 November, after filibustering by the Zionist delegation, the vote was postponed by three days.[62][63] According to multiple sources, had the vote been held on the original set date, it would have received a majority, but less than the required two-thirds.[63][64][65] Various compromise proposals and variations on a single state, including federations and cantonal systems were debated (including those previously rejected in committee).[66][67] The delay was used by supporters of Zionism in New York to put extra pressure on states not supporting the resolution.[62] Reports of pressure for and against the Plan[edit] Reports of pressure for the Plan[edit] Zionists launched an intense White House lobby to have the UNSCOP plan endorsed, and the effects were not trivial.[68] The Democratic Party, a large part of whose contributions came from Jews,[69] informed Truman that failure to live up to promises to support the Jews in Palestine would constitute a danger to the party. The defection of Jewish votes in congressional elections in 1946 had contributed to electoral losses. Truman was, according to Roger Cohen, embittered by feelings of being a hostage to the lobby and its 'unwarranted interference', which he blamed for the contemporary impasse. When a formal American declaration in favour of partition was given on 11 October, a public relations authority declared to the Zionist Emergency Council in a closed meeting:'under no circumstances should any of us believe or think we had won because of the devotion of the American Government to our cause. We had won because of the sheer pressure of political logistics that was applied by the Jewish leadership in the United States'. State Department advice critical of the controversial UNSCOP recommendation to give the overwhelmingly Arab town of Jaffa, and the Negev, to the Jews was overturned by an urgent and secret late meeting organized for Chaim Weizman with Truman, which immediately countermanded the recommendation. The United States initially refrained from pressuring smaller states to vote either way, but Robert A. Lovett reported that America's U.N. delegation's case suffered impediments from high pressure by Jewish groups, and that indications existed that bribes and threats were being used, even of American sanctions against Liberia and Nicaragua.[70] When the UNSCOP plan failed to achieve the necessary majority on 25 November, the lobby 'moved into high gear' and induced the President to overrule the State Department, and let wavering governments know that the U.S. strongly desired partition.[71] Proponents of the Plan reportedly put pressure on nations to vote yes to the Partition Plan. A telegram signed by 26 US senators with influence on foreign aid bills was sent to wavering countries, seeking their support for the partition plan.[72] The US Senate was considering a large aid package at the time, including 60 million dollars to China.[73][74] Many nations reported pressure directed specifically at them: United States (Vote: For): President Truman later noted, "The facts were that not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike anything that had been seen there before, but that the White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders—actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats—disturbed and annoyed me."[75] India (Vote: Against): Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru spoke with anger and contempt for the way the UN vote had been lined up. He said the Zionists had tried to bribe India with millions and at the same time his sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, had received daily warnings that her life was in danger unless "she voted right".[76] Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister, the Indian ambassador to the UN, occasionally hinted that something might change in favour of the Yishuv. But another Indian delegate[who?] said that India would vote for the Arab side, because of their large Moslem minority, although they knew that the Jews had a case.[77] Liberia (Vote: For): Liberia's Ambassador to the United States complained that the US delegation threatened aid cuts to several countries.[78] Harvey S. Firestone, Jr., President of Firestone Natural Rubber Company, with major holdings in the country, also pressured the Liberian government[64][72] Philippines (Vote: For): In the days before the vote, the Philippines' representative General Carlos P. Romulo stated "We hold that the issue is primarily moral. The issue is whether the United Nations should accept responsibility for the enforcement of a policy which is clearly repugnant to the valid nationalist aspirations of the people of Palestine. The Philippines Government holds that the United Nations ought not to accept such responsibility". After a phone call from Washington, the representative was recalled and the Philippines' vote changed.[72] Haiti (Vote: For): The promise of a five million dollar loan may or may not have secured Haiti's vote for partition.[79] France (Vote: For): Shortly before the vote, France's delegate to the United Nations was visited by Bernard Baruch, a long-term Jewish supporter of the Democratic Party who, during the recent world war, had been an economic adviser to President Roosevelt, and had latterly been appointed by President Truman as the United States' ambassador to the newly created UN Atomic Energy Commission. He was, privately, a supporter of the Irgun and its front organization, the American League for a Free Palestine. Baruch implied that a French failure to support the resolution might cause planned American aid to France, which was badly needed for reconstruction, French currency reserves being exhausted and its balance of payments heavily in deficit, not to materialise. Previously, in order to avoid antagonising its Arab colonies, France had not publicly supported the resolution. After considering the danger of American aid being withheld, France finally voted in favour of it. So, too, did France's neighbours, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.[62] Venezuela (Vote: For): Carlos Eduardo Stolk Chairman of the Delegation of Venezuela voted in favor of the 181 resolution.[80] Cuba (Vote: Against): The Cuban delegation stated they would vote against partition "in spite of pressure being brought to bear against us" because they could not be party to coercing the majority in Palestine.[81] Siam (Absent): The Siamese delegations credentials were cancelled after its vote against partition in committee on November 25.[63][82] There is also some evidence that Sam Zemurray put pressure on several banana republics to change their votes.[83] Reports of pressure against the Plan[edit] According to Benny Morris, Wasif Kamal, an Arab Higher Committee official, tried to bribe a delegate to the United Nations, perhaps a Russian.[84] Concerning the welfare of Jews in Arab countries, a number of direct threats were made: Jamal Husseini promised, "The blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East".[85] Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, said: "We will smash the country with our guns and obliterate every place the Jews seek shelter in". Iraq’s prime minister Nuri al-Said told British diplomats that if the United Nations solution was not "satisfactory", "severe measures should be taken against all Jews in Arab countries".[86] Concerning the welfare of Jews in Arab countries, a number of predictions were made: '"On 24 November the head of the Egyptian delegation to the General Assembly, Muhammad Hussein Heykal Pasha, said that “the lives of 1,000,000 Jews in Moslem countries would be jeopardized by the establishment of a Jewish state."[87] At the 29th Meeting of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine on 24 November 1947, Dr Heykal Pasha, the Egyptian delegate, said, "if the U.N decide to amputate a part of Palestine in order to establish a Jewish state, no force on earth could prevent blood from flowing there…Moreover…no force on earth can confine it to the borders of Palestine itself…Jewish blood will necessarily be shed elsewhere in the Arab world… to place in certain and serious danger a million Jews." Mahmud Bey Fawzi (Egypt) said: "…imposed partition was sure to result in bloodshed in Palestine and in the rest of the Arab world".[88] In a speech at the General Assembly Hall at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday, 28 November 1947, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Fadel Jamall, included the following statement: Partition imposed against the will of the majority of the people will jeopardize peace and harmony in the Middle East. Not only the uprising of the Arabs of Palestine is to be expected, but the masses in the Arab world cannot be restrained. The Arab-Jewish relationship in the Arab world will greatly deteriorate. There are more Jews in the Arab world outside of Palestine than there are in Palestine. In Iraq alone, we have about one hundred and fifty thousand Jews who share with Moslems and Christians all the advantages of political and economic rights. Harmony prevails among Moslems, Christians and Jews. But any injustice imposed upon the Arabs of Palestine will disturb the harmony among Jews and non-Jews in Iraq; it will breed inter-religious prejudice and hatred.[89] The Arab states warned the Western Powers that endorsement of the partition plan might be met by either or both an oil embargo and realignment of the Arab states with the Soviet Bloc.[90] Final vote[edit] On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions and 1 absent, in favour of the modified Partition Plan. The final vote, consolidated here by modern United Nations Regional Groups rather than contemporary groupings, was as follows: In favour, (33 countries, 72% of voting)[edit] Latin American and Caribbean (13 countries): Bolivia Brazil Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador Guatemala Haiti Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Western European and Others (8 countries): Belgium Denmark France Iceland Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Sweden Eastern European (5 countries): Byelorussian SSR Czechoslovakia Poland Ukrainian SSR Soviet Union African (2 countries): Liberia South Africa Asia-Pacific (3 countries) Australia New Zealand Philippines North America (2 countries) Canada United States Against, (13 countries, 28% of voting)[edit] Asia-Pacific (9 countries, primarily Middle East sub-area): Afghanistan India Iran Iraq Lebanon Pakistan Saudi Arabia Syria Yemen Western European and Others (2 countries): Greece Turkey African (1 country): Egypt Latin American and Caribbean (1 country): Cuba Abstentions, (10 countries)[edit] Latin American and Caribbean (6 countries): Argentina Chile Colombia El Salvador Honduras Mexico Asia-Pacific (1 country): China African (1 country): Ethiopia Western European and Others (1 country): United Kingdom Eastern European (1 country): Yugoslavia Absent, (1 country)[edit] Asia-Pacific (1 country): Thailand Votes by modern region[edit] If analysed by the modern composition of what later came to be known as the United Nations Regional Groups showed relatively aligned voting styles in the final vote. This, however, does not reflect the regional grouping at the time, as a major reshuffle of regional grouping occurred in 1966. All Western nations voted for the resolution, with the exception of the United Kingdom (the Mandate holder), Greece and Turkey. The Soviet bloc also voted for partition, with the exception of Yugoslavia, which was to be expelled from Cominform the following year. The majority of Latin American nations following Brazilian leadership[citation needed], voted for partition, with a sizeable minority abstaining. Asian countries (primarily Middle Eastern countries) voted against partition, with the exception of the Philippines.[91] Regional GroupMembers in UNGA181 voteUNGA181 ForUNGA181 AgainstUNGA181 Abstained African4211 Asia-Pacific11191 Eastern European6501 LatAm and Caribb.201316 Western Eur. & Others151221 Total UN members56331310 Reactions[edit] Jews[edit] Most Jews in Palestine and around the world reacted to the UN resolution with satisfaction, but some did not. Jews gathered in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to celebrate the U.N. resolution during the whole night after the vote. Great bonfires at Jewish collective farms in the north were blazing. Many big cafes in Tel Aviv served free champagne.[5][92] Mainstream Zionist leaders emphasized the "heavy responsibility" of building a modern Jewish State, and committed to working towards a peaceful coexistence with the region's other inhabitants:[93][94] Jewish units in the United States hailed the action by the United Nations. Most welcomed the Palestine Plan but some felt it did not settle the problem.[95] Some Revisionist Zionists rejected the partition plan as a renunciation of legitimately Jewish national territory.[95] The Irgun Tsvai Leumi, led by Menachem Begin, and the Lehi (also known as the Stern Group or Gang), the two underground, Revisionist-affilitated underground organisations which had been fighting against both the British and Arabs, stated their opposition. Begin warned that the partition would not bring peace because the Arabs would also attack the small state and that "in the war ahead we'll have to stand on our own, it will be a war on our existence and future".[96] He also stated that "the bisection of our homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized."[97] Begin was sure that the creation of a Jewish state would make territorial expansion possible, "after the shedding of much blood."[98] Some Post-Zionist scholars endorse Simha Flapan's view that it is a myth that Zionists accepted the partition as a compromise by which the Jewish community abandoned ambitions for the whole of Palestine and recognized the rights of the Arab Palestinians to their own state. Rather, Flapan argued, acceptance was only a tactical move that aimed to thwart the creation of an Arab Palestinian state and, concomitantly, expand the territory that had been assigned by the UN to the Jewish state.[99][100][101][102][103] Baruch Kimmerling has said that Zionists "officially accepted the partition plan, but invested all their efforts towards improving its terms and maximally expanding their boundaries while reducing the number of Arabs in them."[104] Addressing the Central Committee of the Histadrut (the Eretz Israel Workers Party) days after the UN vote to partition Palestine, Ben-Gurion expressed his apprehension, stating: the total population of the Jewish State at the time of its establishment will be about one million, including almost 40% non-Jews. Such a [population] composition does not provide a stable basis for a Jewish State. This [demographic] fact must be viewed in all its clarity and acuteness. With such a [population] composition, there cannot even be absolute certainty that control will remain in the hands of the Jewish majority... There can be no stable and strong Jewish state so long as it has a Jewish majority of only 60%.[105] Ben-Gurion said "I know of no greater achievement by the Jewish people . . . in its long history since it became a people".[106] Arabs[edit] Arab leaders and governments rejected the plan of partition in the resolution and indicated that they would reject any other plan of partition.[7] The Arab states' delegations declared immediately after the vote for partition that they would not be bound by the decision, and walked out accompanied by the Indian and Pakistani delegates.[107] They argued that it violated the principles of national self-determination in the UN charter which granted people the right to decide their own destiny.[6][9] The Arab delegations to the UN issued a joint statement the day after that vote that stated: "the vote in regard to the Partition of Palestine has been given under great pressure and duress, and that this makes it doubly invalid"[108] On 16 February 1948, UN Palestine Commission to the security council reported that: "Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein."[109] The Arabs were against the establishment of an international regime in Jerusalem too. Arab States[edit] A few weeks after UNSCOP released its report, Azzam Pasha, the General Secretary of the Arab League, was quoted by an Egyptian newspaper as saying "Personally I hope the Jews do not force us into this war because it will be a war of elimination and it will be a dangerous massacre which history will record similarly to the Mongol massacre or the wars of the Crusades."[110] (This statement from October 1947 has often been incorrectly reported as having been made much later on 15 May 1948.)[111] Pasha told Alec Kirkbride: "We will sweep them [the Jews] into the sea". The Syrian president, Shukri al-Quwatli, told his people: "We shall eradicate Zionism".[112] The Egyptian King, Farouk told the American ambassador to Egypt, that in the long run the Arabs would soundly defeat the Jews and drive them out of Palestine.[113] While Azzam Pasha repeated his threats to forcefully thwart the partition, the first important Arab voice who supported the partition was the influential Egyptian daily "Al Mokattam": "We stand for partition because we believe that it is the best final solution for the problem of Palestine...rejection of partition...will lead to further complications and will give the Zionists another space of time to complete their plans of defense and attack...a delay of one more year which would not benefit the Arabs but would benefit the Jews, especially after the British evacuation."[114] On 20 May 1948, Azzam told reporters "We are fighting for an Arab Palestine. Whatever the outcome the Arabs will stick to their offer of equal citizenship for Jews in Arab Palestine and let them be as Jewish as they like. In areas where they predominate they will have complete autonomy."[115] The Arab League said that some of the Jews would have to be expelled from a Palestinian Arab state.[116] Abdullah appointed Ibrahim Hashem Pasha as the Military Governor of the Arab areas occupied by troops of the Transjordan Army. He was a former Prime Minister of Transjordan who supported partition of Palestine as proposed by the Peel Commission and the United Nations.[117] Arabs in Palestine[edit] Haj Amin al-Husseini said in March 1948 to an interviewer in a Jaffa daily Al Sarih that the Arabs did not intend merely to prevent partition but "would continue fighting until the Zionists were Annihilated".[112] Zionists attributed Arab rejection of the plan to mere intransigence. Palestinian Arabs opposed the very idea of partition but reiterated that this partition plan was unfair: the majority of the land (56%) would go to a Jewish state, when Jews at that stage legally owned only 6-7% of it and remained a minority of the population (33% in 1946).[118][119][120][121][122][123][124][125][126] There were also disproportionate allocations under the plan and the area under Jewish control contained 45% of the Palestinian population. The proposed Arab state was only given 45% of the land, much of which was unfit for agriculture. Jaffa, though geographically separated, was to be part of the Arab state.[126] However, most of the proposed Jewish state was the Negev desert.[49][127] The plan allocated to the Jewish State most of the Negev desert that was sparsely populated and unsuitable for agriculture but also a "vital land bridge protecting British interests from the Suez Canal to Iraq"[128][129] Few Palestinian Arabs joined the Arab Liberation Army because they suspected that the other Arab States did not plan on an independent Palestinian state. According to Ian Bickerton, for that reason many of them favored partition and indicated a willingness to live alongside a Jewish state.[130] He also mentions that the Nashashibi family backed King Abdullah and union with Transjordan.[131] The Arabs promised to respect the rights of the Jewish minority.[132] The AHC demanded that in a Palestinian Arab state, the majority of the Jews should not be citizens (those who had not lived in Palestine before the British Mandate).[85] According to Musa Alami, the mufti would agree to partition if he were promised that he would rule the future Arab state".[133] The Arab Higher Committee responded to the partition resolution and declared a three-day general strike in Palestine to begin the following day. On 2 December a large Arab mob, armed with clubs and knives, attacked the Jerusalem New Commercial Center attacking Jewish passersby and shops. The Haganah intelligence identified two AHC officials, as leading the crowd.[134] On 4 December a band of 120–150 gunmen from Salame attacked the nearby kibbutz Efal. The settlers, together with Palmah reinforcements, beat them off.[135] British government[edit] When Bevin received the partition proposal, he promptly ordered for it not to be imposed on the Arabs.[136][137] The plan was vigorously debated in the British parliament. In a British cabinet meeting at 4 December 1947, it was decided that the Mandate would end at midnight 14 May 1948, the complete withdrawal by 1 August 1948, and Britain would not enforce the UN partition plan.[138] On 11 December 1947, Britain announced the Mandate would end at midnight 14 May 1948 and its sole task would be to complete withdrawal by 1 August 1948.[139] During the period in which the British withdrawal was completed, Britain refused to share the administration of Palestine with a proposed UN transition regime, to allow the UN Palestine Commission to establish a presence in Palestine earlier than a fortnight before the end of the Mandate, to allow the creation of official Jewish and Arab militias or to assist in smoothly handing over territory or authority to any successor.[140][141] United States government[edit] The United States declined to recognize the All-Palestine government in Gaza by explaining that it had accepted the UN Mediator's proposal. The Mediator had recommended that Palestine, as defined in the original Mandate including Transjordan, might form a union.[142] Bernadotte's diary said the Mufti had lost credibility on account of his unrealistic predictions regarding the defeat of the Jewish militias. Bernadotte noted "It would seem as though in existing circumstances most of the Palestinian Arabs would be quite content to be incorporated in Transjordan."[143] Subsequent events[edit] The Partition Plan with Economic Union was not realized in the days following the 29 November 1947 resolution as envisaged by the General Assembly.[11] It was followed by outbreaks of violence in Mandatory Palestine between Palestinian Jews and Arabs known as the 1947–48 Civil War.[10] After Alan Cunningham, the High Commissioner of Palestine, left Jerusalem, on the morning of 14 May the British army left the city as well. The British left a power vacuum in Jerusalem and made no measures to establish the international regime in Jerusalem.[144] At midnight on 14 May 1948, the British Mandate expired,[145] and Britain disengaged its forces. Earlier in the evening, the Jewish People's Council had gathered at the Tel Aviv Museum, and approved a proclamation, declaring "the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel".[6][146] The 1948 Arab–Israeli War began with the invasion of, or intervention in, Palestine by the Arab States on 15 May 1948.[147] Resolution 181 as a legal basis for Palestinian statehood[edit] In 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization published the Palestinian Declaration of Independence relying on Resolution 181, arguing that the resolution continues to provide international legitimacy for the right of the Palestinian people to sovereignty and national independence.[148] A number of scholars have written in support of this view.[149][150][151] A General Assembly request for an advisory opinion, Resolution ES-10/14 (2004), specifically cited resolution 181(II) as a "relevant resolution", and asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) what are the legal consequences of the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. Judge Abdul Koroma explained the majority opinion: "The Court has also held that the right of self-determination as an established and recognized right under international law applies to the territory and to the Palestinian people. Accordingly, the exercise of such right entitles the Palestinian people to a State of their own as originally envisaged in resolution 181 (II) and subsequently confirmed."[152] In response, Prof. Paul De Waart said that the Court put the legality of the 1922 League of Nations Palestine Mandate and the 1947 UN Plan of Partition beyond doubt once and for all.[153] ***** Israel Maritime League The S.S. Kedmak, first merchant ship to fly the Israel flag, anchored off this port, was the scene last night of the first world convention of the Israel Maritime League, attended by 200 delegates from the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, South Africa, Great Britain, France and Italy representing 40,000 members.The Israel merchant fleet has increased since the creation of the Jewish state from four ships of 6,000 tons to 21 totalling 50,000 tons, carrying passengers to Italy and France and freight to the United States and Western Europe, it was reported. Minister of Communications David Remez told the meeting the primary task facing the League was the organization of adequate agencies to train youth for the merchant marine. The S.S. Kedmak, first merchant ship to fly the Israel flag, anchored off this port, was the scene last night of the first world convention of the Israel Maritime League, attended by 200 delegates from the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, South Africa, Great Britain, France and Italy representing 40,000 members. The Israel merchant fleet has increased since the creation of the Jewish state from four ships of 6,000 tons to 21 totalling 50,000 tons, carrying passengers to Italy and France and freight to the United States and Western Europe, it was reported. Minister of Communications David Remez told the meeting the primary task facing the League was the organization of adequate agencies to train youth for the merchant marine.***** The Peel Commission, formally known as the Palestine Royal Commission, was a British Royal Commission of Inquiry, headed by Lord Peel, appointed in 1936 to investigate the causes of unrest in Mandatory Palestine, which was administered by the United Kingdom, following a six-month-long Arab general strike. On 7 July 1937, the commission published a report that, for the first time, stated that the League of Nations Mandate had become unworkable and recommended partition.[1] The British cabinet endorsed the Partition plan in principle, but requested more information.[2] Following the publication, in 1938 the Woodhead Commission was appointed to examine it in detail and recommend an actual partition plan. The Arabs opposed the partition plan and condemned it unanimously.[3] The Arab Higher Committee opposed the idea of a Jewish state[4] and called for an independent state of Palestine, "with protection of all legitimate Jewish and other minority rights and safeguarding of reasonable British interests".[5] They also demanded cessation of all Jewish immigration and land purchase.[4] They argued that the creation of a Jewish state and lack of independent Palestine was a betrayal of the word given by Britain.[2][6] The Zionist leadership was bitterly divided over the plan.[4] In a resolution adopted at the 1937 Zionist Congress, the delegates rejected the specific partition plan. Yet the principle of partition is generally thought to have been "accepted" or "not rejected outright" by any major faction: the delegates empowered the leadership to pursue future negotiations.[4][7][8][9] The Jewish Agency Council later attached a request that a conference be convened to explore a peaceful settlement in terms of an undivided Palestine.[4] According to Benny Morris, Ben-Gurion and Weizmann saw it "as a stepping stone to some further expansion and the eventual takeover of the whole of Palestine".[4][10] History Palestine Royal Commission Cmd 5479[11][irrelevant citation] With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, The United Kingdom was given a mandate by the League of Nations to administer the region known as Palestine. The mandate continued in force until the United Kingdom withdrew from it in 1948.[12] The solution led to other problems, however, as the British sought to honor the Balfour Declaration while protecting the rights of the prior inhabitants of the territory. The British government investigated numerous possibilities for the region, including partition. The commission was established at a time of increased violence; serious clashes between Arabs and Jews broke out in 1936 and were to last three years. On 11 November 1936, the commission arrived in Palestine to investigate the reasons behind the uprising. The commission was charged with determining the cause of the riots, and judging the grievances of both sides. Chaim Weizmann made a speech on behalf of the Jews. On 25 November 1936, testifying before the Peel Commission, Weizmann said that there are in Europe 6,000,000 Jews ... "for whom the world is divided into places where they cannot live and places where they cannot enter."[13] The Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, testified in front of the commission, opposing any partition of Arab lands with the Jews. He demanded full cessation of Jewish immigration. Although the Arabs continued to boycott the Commission officially, there was a sense of urgency to respond to Weizmann's appeal to restore calm. The former Mayor of Jerusalem Ragheb Bey al-Nashashibi—who was the Mufti's rival in the internal Palestinian arena, was thus sent to explain the Arab perspective through unofficial channels.[citation needed] In 1981 it was disclosed that the Jewish Agency Executive Political Department had installed microphones in the room in which the commission was meeting and Ben Gurion was able to read transcripts of evidence held in camera.[14] Membership The Chairman of the Commission was William Peel, 1st Earl Peel and the Vice-Chairman was Sir Horace Rumbold, 9th Baronet. The other members were Sir Laurie Hammond, Sir Morris Carter, Sir Harold Morris, and Reginald Coupland. Conclusions Lord Peel, 1936 Chaim Weizmann giving evidence The causes of the Arab rebellion that broke out in the previous year were judged to be First, the desire of the Arabs for national independence; secondly, their antagonism to the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, quickened by their fear of Jewish domination. Among contributory causes were the effect on Arab opinion of the attainment of national independence by ‘Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Egypt, Syria and the Lebanon; the rush of Jewish immigrants escaping from Central and Eastern Europe; the inequality of opportunity enjoyed by Arabs and Jews respectively in placing their case before Your Majesty’s Government and the public; the growth of Arab mistrust; Arab alarm at the continued purchase of Arab land by the intensive character and the "modernism" of Jewish nationalism; and lastly the general uncertainty, accentuated by the ambiguity of certain phrases in the Mandate, as to the ultimate intentions of the Mandatory Power.[15] The Commission found that the drafters of the Mandate could not have foreseen the advent of massive Jewish immigration, that they considered due to "drastic restriction of immigration into the United States, the advent of the National Socialist Government in Germany in 1933 and the increasing economic pressure on the Jews in Poland."[16] They wrote that "The continued impact of a highly intelligent and enterprising race, backed by large financial resources, on a comparatively poor indigenous community, on a different cultural level, may produce in time serious reactions."[17] The Commission found that "though the Arabs have benefited by the development of the country owing to Jewish immigration, this has had no conciliatory effect. On the contrary, improvement in the economic situation in Palestine has meant the deterioration of the political situation".[17] Addressing the "Arab charge that the Jews have obtained too large a proportion of good land cannot be maintained", the Commission noted that "Much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamp and uncultivated when it was purchased."[18] They write that "The shortage of land is, we consider, due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population".[18] "Endeavours to control the alienation of land by Arabs to Jews have not been successful. In the hills there is no more room for further close settlement by Jews; in the plains it should only be allowed under certain restrictions."[15] The Commission stated that Government have attempted to discharge the contradictory obligations of the Mandatory under conditions of great difficulty by "holding the balance" between Jews and Arabs. Repeated attempts to conciliate either race have only increased the trouble. The situation in Palestine has reached a deadlock.[15] Development of local autonomy and selfgoverning institutions, this also has been hampered.[15] The Commission concluded that the prospect of a unified Palestine with Jews and Arabs as fellow citizens in a common state was remote due to the highly nationalistic natures of the two communities. On the nature of the Yishuv, it wrote that: "The Jewish National Home is no longer an experiment. The growth of its population has been accompanied by political, social and economic developments along the lines laid down at the outset. The chief novelty is the urban and industrial development. The contrast between the modern democratic and primarily European character of the National Home and that of the Arab world around it is striking. The temper of the Home is strongly nationalist. There can be no question of fusion or assimilation between Jewish and Arab cultures. The National Home cannot be half-national."[19] It also concluded that such a prospect was growing less realistic with time due to the nature of the Jewish education system, which was causing a rise in Jewish nationalism, writing that "from the ages of three or four years, when children enter the kindergarten to be taught Hebrew if they do not know it already, pride in the past of Jewry and in the National Home as an exclusively and intensely Jewish achievement is the dynamic centre-point of their whole intellectual development. The idea that they are to share their life in any way with the Arabs, that they are growing up to be fellow-citizens with Arabs in a common Palestinian state, is only recognised in the teaching of a little Arabic in the secondary schools... So far, in fact, from facilitating a better understanding between the races, the Jewish educational system is making it more and more difficult as, year by year, its production of eager Jewish nationalists mounts up."[20] The committee concluded that Arab nationalism was also a potent force and that the two communities were more loyal to their own national leaderships than the Palestine administration: "Arab nationalism is as intense a force as Jewish. The Arab leaders' demand for national self-government and the shutting down of the Jewish National Home has remained unchanged since 1929. Like Jewish nationalism, Arab nationalism is stimulated by the educational system and by the growth of the Youth Movement. It has also been greatly encouraged by the recent Anglo-Egyptian and Franco-Syrian Treaties. The gulf between the races is thus already wide and will continue to widen if the present Mandate is maintained. The position of the Palestine Government between the two antagonistic communities is unenviable. There are two rival bodies – the Arab Higher Committee allied with the Supreme Moslem Council on the one hand, and the Jewish Agency allied with the Va'ad Leumi on the other – who make a stronger appeal to the natural loyalty of the Arab and the Jews than does the Government of Palestine. The sincere attempts of the Government to treat the two races impartially have not improved the relations between them. Nor has the policy of conciliating Arab opposition been successful. The events of last year proved that conciliation is useless."[19] The summary report statement concerning the possibility of lasting settlement states: "An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country. There is no common ground between them. Their national aspirations are incompatible. The Arabs desire to revive the traditions of the Arab golden age. The Jews desire to show what they can achieve when restored to the land in which the Jewish nation was born. Neither of the two national ideals permits of combination in the service of a single State.[21] Recommendations The Commission reached the conclusion that the Mandate had become unworkable and must be abolished[1] in favour of partition, as the only solution to the Arab-Jewish "deadlock". It outlined ten points on: a Treaty system between the Arab and Jewish States and the new Mandatory Government; a Mandate for the Holy places; the frontiers; the need for Inter-State Subvention; the need for British Subvention; tariffs and ports; nationality; civil service; Industrial concessions; and the exchange of land and populations.[22] A Treaty system based on the Iraqi-Syrian precedent, proposed: Permanent mandates for the Jerusalem area and "corridor" stretching to the Mediterranean coast at Jaffa—and the land under its authority (and accordingly, the transfer of both Arab and Jewish populations) be apportioned between an Arab and Jewish state. The Jewish side was to receive a territorially smaller portion in the mid-west and north, from Mount Carmel to south of Be'er Tuvia, as well as the Jezreel Valley and the Galilee, while the Arab state linked with Trans-Jordan was to receive territory in the south and mid-east which included Judea, Samaria, and the sizable Negev desert.[23] The report stated that Jews contribute more per capita to the revenues of Palestine than the Arabs, and the Government has thereby been enabled to maintain public services for the Arabs at a higher level than would otherwise have been possible. Partition would mean, on the one hand, that the Arab Area would no longer profit from the taxable capacity of the Jewish Area. On the other hand, (1) the Jews would acquire a new right of sovereignty in the Jewish Area; (2) that Area, as we have defined it, would be larger than the existing area of Jewish land and settlement; (3) the Jews would be freed from their present liability for helping to promote the welfare of Arabs outside that Area. It is suggested, therefore, that the Jewish State should pay a subvention to the Arab State when Partition comes into effect. Citing the separation of Sind from Bombay and of Burma from the Indian Empire, as precedents for such financial arrangement.[23][24] The report stated that if Partition is to be effective in promoting a final settlement it must mean more than drawing a frontier and establishing two States. Sooner or later there should be a transfer of land and, as far as possible, an exchange of population.[23][25] Citing as precedent the 1923 Greek and Turkish exchange, which addressed the constant friction between their minorities. While noting the absence of cultivable land to resettle the Arabs, which would necessitate the execution of large-scale plans for irrigation, water-storage, and development in Trans-Jordan, Beersheba and the Jordan Valley.[23][25] The population exchange, if carried out, would have involved the transfer of up to 225,000 Arabs and 1,250 Jews.[23][25] Reactions The Arab reaction The entire spectrum of Palestinian Arab society rejected the partition plan. There was widespread public opposition including in the media and by religious figures.[4][5] According to Henry Laurens, the Arabs saw the publication of the plan as a ringing disavowal of every key undertaking the Mandatory authorities had made since its inception, that there would be no separate Jewish state, no land expropriations and no expulsions of people. The proposed land swaps and population transfers were seen as annulling and inverting a century of economic development of the littoral region, with, apart from Jaffa and Gaza, Palestinians dispossessed of the essential rural and urban heritage that had evolved over the preceding century of coastal development. Jerusalem was placed outside the future Palestinian state.[26] Palestinians were shocked both by the declaration their land would be divided, and that they themselves would be denied statehood (but only a union with Transjordan), while the Jewish state, extending over a third of the country,[5][6] would absorb the whole of the Galilee, where an overwhelming percentage of the land was owned by Arabs and Jews had only a slender presence.[27][28][29] In compensation, the Arabs were offered valuable areas to the east of Jordan and the southern portion of the Beisan sub-district where irrigation would have been possible.[30] Indignation was widespread with Arabs complaining that the Plan had allotted to them "the barren mountains", while the Jews would receive most of the five cultivable plains, the maritime Plain, the Acre Plain, the Marj Ibn 'Amir, Al Huleh and the Jordan Valley[31] For the Arabs, the plan envisaged giving Zionists the best land, with 82% of Palestine's principal export, citrus fruit, consigned to Jewish control.[31][30][32] The idea of transfer of population met strong opposition.[10] Under the Peel proposal, before transfer, there would be 1,250 Jews in the proposed Arab state, while there would be 225,000 Arabs in the Jewish state. The Peel proposal suggested a population transfer based on the model of Greece and Turkey in 1923, which would have been "in the last resort ... compulsory".[5] It was understood on all sides that there was no way of dividing the land which would not have meant a large number of Arabs (a large minority or even a majority) in the land designated for a Jewish state.[33] The solution proposed by the Peel Commission was partition. The Jews were to gain statehood in 20 percent of the territory of Palestine, including most of the coastline and some of the country's most fertile agricultural land, in the Jezreel Valley and the Galilee. The Arabs were allotted the poorest lands of Palestine, including the Negev Desert and the Arava Valley, as well as the hill country of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. — Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History[34] At the leadership level, there were tensions between the factions. Husseini, who according to his biographer was an "authoritarian who could not tolerate opposition", feared the recommended merger with Transjordan under the rule of King Abdullah. The latter stood to gain much from partition; reaching an accord with the Nashashibis could have consolidated his rule and left Husseini powerless.[4] The Palestinians also opposed being consigned to the far more economically feeble society of the Transjordan.[26] Despite some initial support by the Nashashibi family of notables and Jordan's King Abdullah,[4][1][27] the Arab Higher Committee (HAC) and the Nashashibis (who had strong roots in both the littoral region and Jerusalem and had defected from the HAC) opposed the partition plan and condemned it unanimously. They argued that the creation of a Jewish state and lack of independent Palestine was a betrayal of the word given by Britain,[2] and emphatically rejected the idea of giving land to the Jews.[6] This objection was accompanied by a proposal that Britain adhere to its promise of a sovereign democratic state with constitutional guarantees for the rights of the Jewish minority.[4] The Plan was also repudiated at the Bloudan Conference convened in Syria on 8 September, where parties from all over the Arab world rejected both the partition and establishment of a Jewish state in the Palestine Mandate.[35] In 1937, the US Consul General at Jerusalem reported to the State Department that the Mufti refused the principle of partition and declined to consider it. The Consul said the emir Abdullah urged acceptance on the ground that realities must be faced, but wanted modification of the proposed boundaries and Arab administrations in the neutral enclave. The Consul also noted that Nashashibi sidestepped the principle, but was willing to negotiate for favorable modifications.[36] The Jewish reaction Zionist Congress resolution on the Peel Commission partition plan On 20 August 1937, the Twentieth Zionist Congress expressed that, at the time of the Balfour Declaration, it was understood that the Jewish National Home was to be established in the whole of historic Palestine, including Trans-Jordan, and that inherent in the Declaration was the possibility of the evolution of Palestine into a Jewish State.[37] While some factions at the Congress supported the Peel Report, arguing that later the borders could be adjusted, others opposed the proposal because the Jewish State would be too small. The Congress decided to reject the specific borders recommended by the Peel Commission, but empowered its executive to negotiate a more favorable plan for a Jewish State in Palestine.[38][39] In the wake of the Peel Commission the Jewish Agency set up committees to begin planning for the state. At the time, it had already created a complete administrative apparatus amounting to "a Government existing side by side with the Mandatory Government."[39] At the same Zionist Congress, David Ben-Gurion, then chairman of the executive committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, told those in attendance that, though "there could be no question...of giving up any part of the Land of Israel,... it was arguable that the ultimate goal would be achieved most quickly by accepting the Peel proposals."[40] University of Arizona professor Charles D. Smith suggests that, "Weizmann and Ben-Gurion did not feel they had to be bound by the borders proposed [by the Peel Commission]. These could be considered temporary boundaries to be expanded in the future."[40] Ben-Gurion saw the plan as only a stage in the realisation of a larger Jewish state.[41] The two main Jewish leaders, Chaim Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, had convinced the Zionist Congress to approve equivocally the Peel recommendations as a basis for more negotiation.[42][43][44] Aftermath The Peel Plan proved to be the master partition plan, on which all those that followed were either based, or to which they were compared, ushering in a fundamental change in the British outlook on Palestine's future.[2] Following the report's publication the British Government released a statement of policy, agreeing with its conclusions and proposing to seek from the League of Nations authority to proceed with a plan of partition.[1] In March 1938, the British appointed the Woodhead Commission to "examine the Peel Commission plan in detail and to recommend an actual partition plan". The Woodhead Commission considered three different plans, one of which was based on the Peel plan. Reporting in 1938, the Commission rejected the Peel plan primarily on the grounds that it could not be implemented without a massive forced transfer of Arabs (an option that the British government had already ruled out).[45] With dissent from some of its members, the Commission instead recommended a plan that would leave the Galilee under British mandate, but emphasized serious problems with it that included a lack of financial self-sufficiency of the proposed Arab State.[45] The British Government accompanied the publication of the Woodhead Report by a statement of policy rejecting partition as impracticable due to "political, administrative and financial difficulties".[46] At the Bloudan Conference of 1937, parties from all over the Arab world rejected both the partition and establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, thus claiming all of Palestine.***** Haaretz (Hebrew: הָאָרֶץ lit. 'The Land [of Israel]', originally Ḥadshot Haaretz – Hebrew: חַדְשׁוֹת הָאָרֶץ, IPA: [χadˈʃot haˈʔaʁets] lit. 'News of the Land [of Israel]') is an Israeli newspaper. It was founded in 1918, making it the longest running newspaper currently in print in Israel. It is published in both Hebrew and English in the Berliner format. The English edition is published and sold together with The New York Times International Edition. Its Hebrew and English editions are available on the internet. In North America, it is published as a weekly newspaper, combining articles from the Friday edition with a roundup from the rest of the week. Haaretz is Israel's newspaper of record.[4][5] It is known for its left-wing and liberal stances on domestic and foreign issues.[6] As of 2022, Haaretz has the third-largest circulation in Israel.[7] It is widely read by international observers, especially in its English edition, and discussed in the international press.[8] According to the Center for Research Libraries, among Israel's daily newspapers, "Haaretz is considered the most influential and respected for both its news coverage and its commentary."[9] History and ownership Haaretz was first published in 1918 as a newspaper sponsored by the British military government in Palestine.[10] In 1919, it was taken over by a group of socialist-oriented Zionists, mainly from Russia.[11][12] The newspaper was established on 18 June 1919 by a group of businessmen including the philanthropist Isaac Leib Goldberg,[13] initially called Hadashot Ha'aretz ("News of the Land"). Later, the name was shortened to Haaretz.[14] The literary section of the paper attracted leading Hebrew writers of the time.[15] The newspaper was initially published in Jerusalem. From 1919 to 1922, the paper was headed by a succession of editors, among them Leib Yaffe. It was closed briefly due to a budgetary shortfall and reopened in Tel Aviv at the beginning of 1923 under the editorship of Moshe Glickson, who held the post for 15 years.[12] The Tel Aviv municipality granted the paper financial support by paying in advance for future advertisements.[16] Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Haaretz's liberal viewpoint was to some degree associated with the General Zionist "A" faction,[17] which later helped form the Progressive Party,[18] though it was nonpartisan and careful not to espouse any specific party line.[19][20] It was considered the most sophisticated of the Yishuv's dailies.[17] Salman Schocken, a Jewish businessman who left Germany in 1934 after the Nazis had come to power, bought the paper in December 1935. Schocken was active in Brit Shalom, also known as the Jewish–Palestinian Peace Alliance, a body supporting co-existence between Jews and Arabs which was sympathetic to a homeland for both peoples. His son, Gershom Schocken, became the chief editor in 1939 and held that position until his death in 1990.[21] The Schocken family were the sole owners of the Haaretz Group until August 2006, when they sold a 25% stake to German publisher M. DuMont Schauberg.[22] The deal was negotiated with the help of the former Israeli ambassador to Germany, Avi Primor.[23] This deal was seen as controversial in Israel as DuMont Schauberg's father, Kurt Neven DuMont, was member of the Nazi Party and his publishing house promoted Nazi ideology.[24] On 12 June 2011, it was announced that Russian-Israeli businessman Leonid Nevzlin had purchased a 20% stake in the Haaretz Group, buying 15% from the family and 5% from M. DuMont Schauberg.[25] In December 2019, members of the Schocken family bought all of the Haaretz stock belonging to M. DuMont Schauberg.[1] The deal saw the Schocken family reach 75% ownership, with the remaining 25% owned by Leonid Nevzlin.[1] In October 2012, a union strike mobilized to protest planned layoffs by the Haaretz management, causing a one-day interruption of Haaretz and its TheMarker business supplement. According to Israel Radio, it was the first time since 1965 that a newspaper did not go to press on account of a strike.[26][27] Management The newspaper's editorial policy was defined by Gershom Schocken, who was editor-in-chief from 1939 to 1990. Schocken was succeeded as editor-in-chief by Hanoch Marmari. In 2004 David Landau replaced Marmari and was succeeded by Dov Alfon in 2008.[28] The current editor-in-chief of the newspaper is Aluf Benn, who replaced Alfon in August 2011.[2] Charlotte Halle became editor of the English print edition in February 2008. Walter Gross was a member of the governing editorial board and a columnist with the paper from 1951 to 1995.[29] Editorial policy and viewpoints Haaretz describes itself as having "a broadly liberal outlook both on domestic issues and on international affairs",[30] and has been summarized as being "liberal on security, civil rights and economy, supportive of the Supreme Court, very critical of Netanyahu's government".[31] Others describe it alternatively as liberal,[32][33][34] centre-left,[35] left-wing,[36][37][38] and the country's only major left-leaning newspaper.[39] The paper opposes retaining Israeli control over the Palestinian territories and consistently supports peace initiatives.[40] The Haaretz editorial line is supportive of weaker elements in Israeli society, such as sex workers, foreign laborers, Israeli Arabs, Ethiopian immigrants, and Russian immigrants.[11] In 2006, the BBC said that Haaretz takes a moderate stance on foreign policy and security.[41] David Remnick in The New Yorker described Haaretz as "easily the most liberal newspaper in Israel", its ideology as left-wing and its temper as "insistently oppositional".[28] According to Ira Sharkansky, Haaretz's op-ed pages are open to a variety of opinions.[42] J. J. Goldberg, the editor of the American The Jewish Daily Forward, describes Haaretz as "Israel's most vehemently anti-settlement daily paper".[43] Stephen Glain of The Nation described Haaretz as "Israel's liberal beacon", citing its editorials voicing opposition to the occupation, the discriminatory treatment of Arab citizens, and the mindset that led to the Second Lebanon War.[44] A 2003 study in The International Journal of Press/Politics concluded that Haaretz's reporting of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was more favorable to Israelis than to Palestinians but less so than that of The New York Times.[45] In 2016, Jeffrey Goldberg, the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, wrote: "I like a lot of the people at Haaretz, and many of its positions, but the cartoonish anti-Israelism and anti-Semitism can be grating."[46][47] Formatting, circulation, and reputation Front page of the Hebrew and English editions Circulation In 2022, a TGI survey found that Haaretz was the newspaper with the third largest readership in Israel, with an exposure rate of 4.7%, below Israel Hayom's rate of 31% and Yedioth Ahronoth's 23.9%.[7] Formatting and image Haaretz uses smaller headlines and print than other mass circulation papers in Israel. Less space is devoted to pictures, and more to political analysis. Opinion columns are generally written by regular commentators rather than guest writers.[11] Its editorial pages are considered influential among government leaders.[48] Apart from the news, Haaretz publishes feature articles on social and environmental issues, as well as book reviews, investigative reporting, and political commentary. In 2008, the newspaper itself reported a paid subscribership of 65,000, daily sales of 72,000 copies, and 100,000 on weekends.[3] The English edition has a subscriber base of 15,000.[44] Readership and reception Despite its historically relatively low circulation in Israel, Haaretz has for many years been described as Israel's most influential daily newspaper.[49][50][51] In 2006, it exposed a scandal regarding professional and ethical standards at Israeli hospitals.[52] Its readership includes members of Israel's intelligentsia and members of its political and economic elites.[53][54] In 1999, surveys showed that Haaretz readership had above-average education, income, and wealth, and that most were Ashkenazi Jews.[44][55] Some have said that Haaretz functions in Israel much as The New York Times does in the United States, as a newspaper of record.[56][57] In 2007, Shmuel Rosner, Haaretz's former U.S. correspondent, told The Nation, "people who read it are better educated and more sophisticated than most, but the rest of the country doesn't know it exists."[44] According to Hanoch Marmari, a former Haaretz editor, the newspaper has lost its political influence in Israel because it became "detached" from the country's political life.[58] Andrea Levin, executive director of the pro-Israel Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA), said Haaretz was doing "damage to the truth" and sometimes making serious factual errors without correcting them.[59] According to The Jerusalem Post, Haaretz editor-in-chief David Landau said at the 2007 Limmud conference in Moscow that he had told his staff not to report on criminal investigations against Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in order to promote Sharon's 2004–2005 Gaza disengagement plan.[60] In April 2017, Haaretz published an op-ed by a staff writer that said the Israeli religious right was worse than Hezbollah.[61][62] Condemnation followed, including from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Reuven Rivlin, and other government ministers and MPs, as well as from Opposition Leader Isaac Herzog.[63] Internet editions Haaretz operates both Hebrew and English language websites. The two sites offer up-to-the-minute breaking news, live Q&A sessions with newsmakers from Israel, the Palestinian territories and elsewhere, and blogs covering a range of political standpoints and opinions. The two sites fall under the supervision of Lior Kodner, the head of digital media for the Haaretz Group. Individually, Simon Spungin is the editor of Haaretz.com (English) and Avi Scharf is the editor of Haaretz.co.il (Hebrew).[64][65] Offices Former Haaretz building (1932–1973), of which only part of the facade has been preserved The Haaretz building is on Schocken Street in south Tel Aviv.[28] The former Haaretz building of 1932–1973 was designed by architect Joseph Berlin. It was demolished in the early 1990s, with only part of the facade preserved and integrated into the new building at 56, Maza Street. Journalists and writers Present Ruth Almog – literature, publicist Merav Arlosoroff – economy affairs columnist (in The Marker) Avraham Balaban – Tel Aviv and cultural history publicist Zvi Barel – Middle East affair commentator Omer Benjakob - technology, disinformation, Wikipedia Aluf Benn – editor-in-chief Bradley Burston – political columnist[66] Saggi Cohen – food columnist Lily Galili[67] Doram Gaunt – food columnist Avirama Golan Ehud Barak Ehud Olmert Zehava Galon Amos Harel – military correspondent Israel Harel – columnist Danna Harman – feature writer Amira Hass – Ramallah-based Palestinian affairs correspondent. Avi Issacharoff – military correspondent Uri Klein – film critic[68] Yitzhak Laor – publicist Alex Levac – photo columnist Gideon Levy – Palestinian affairs columnist Amir Mandel – classic music critic Amir Oren – military affairs Sammy Peretz – economic affairs columnist (in The Marker) Anshel Pfeffer – political and military affairs Tsafrir Rinat – environmental issues Guy Rolnick – economic affairs editorialist (of The Marker) Doron Rosenblum – satirist, publicist Ruth Schuster,[69] Senior Editor for archaeology and science at the Haaretz English Edition. Tom Segev – historian, political commentator Ben Shalev – popular music critic Nehemia Shtrasler – economic affairs, publicist Simon Spungin – Managing Editor, English Edition Gadi Taub – political commentary Amir Tibon Yossi Verter – political reporter Esther Zandberg – architecture Benny Ziffer – literature, publicist Past Passengers on board a Palestine Airways Short Scion, 1939. The second passenger on the left is reading Haaretz. Nathan Alterman (1910-1970) Moshe Arens – columnist Ehud Asheri[70] Gidi Avivi – popular music critic[71] Meron Benvenisti (1934-2020) – political columnist Noam Ben Ze'ev – music critic Yoram Bronowski (1948-2001) – literary critic, TV critic Arie Caspi[72] Daniel Dagan Akiva Eldar – diplomatic affairs analyst[73] Amos Elon (1926-2009) – correspondent, editor, writer Boaz Evron Michael Handelzalts – theater critic, columnist Sayed Kashua – satiric columnist, author Jerrold Kessel Tami Litani Aviva Lori[74] Yoel Marcus – political commentator, publicist[75] Yossi Melman – former intelligence correspondent Natasha Mozgovaya – former U.S. correspondent Ran Reznick – health issues[68] Daniel Rogov – food and wine critic Danny Rubinstein – former Arab affairs analyst Gideon Samet – political commentator[76] Yossi Sarid (1040-2015) – politician, publicist Ze'ev Schiff – military and defense analyst Daniel Ben Simon[77] Ruth Sinai – social welfare and humanitarian issues Ze'ev Segal – law Ari Shavit – political columnist[78] Yair Sheleg – Jewish religious affairs[79] Nadav Shragai Ze'ev Sternhell – political commentary Benjamin Tammuz (1919-1989) - literary critic, writer, editor of the literary supplement Pavel Wolberg – photographer Merav Michaeli[35] ebay3657 / 109 + 3458 /99
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